ABSTRACT The Internet of things have been widely used to improve our daily life. Public-key cryptosystem plays a central role in the security of IoT. However, classic public-key cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC are not suitable for IoT because of the complicated encryption and decryption operations. NTRU is an efficient public-key cryptosystem. In this paper, we first generalize NTRU and propose a group-based NTRU-like public-key cryptosystem, namely GTRU. Then, we construct high-performance GTRU for IoT. Finally, security analysis shows that our proposed GTRU for IoT is more secure than NTRU against lattice-based attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) refers a global network, where various IoT devices are connected with each other via the internet. With the great potential of IoT, kinds of IoT applications, such as smart home appliances, intelligent transportation, smart communities, and smart healthcare have been used to improve our daily life in the past few years. However, IoT devices are extremely vulnerable to be attacked because of their limitation in energy, computation, storage, and network capacity [1] - [4] .
Public-key cryptosystems play a critical role in design of the security schemes for IoT. Stergiou et al. [5] surveyed the security challenges of the integration of IoT and Cloud Computing and proposed an efficient security model based on RSA ( Rivest, Shamir and Adelman) [6] for the integration of IoT and Cloud Computing. Jose et al. [7] reviewed the major security issues and the security algorithms in IoT, and described an efficient cryptographic method based on ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) [8] for IoT. Wang et al. [9] proposed a security scheme based on bilinear pairing for IoT. Yan et al. [10] proposed an access control scheme based on bilinear pairing for IoT. However, classic public-key cryptosystems are not suitable for IoT because of the complicated encryption and decryption operations. In 1996,
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Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman [11] proposed the NTRU (Number Theory Research Unit) public-key cryptosystem. The most prominent feature of NTRU is its high speed in encryption and decryption operations for practical security levels under best known attacks compared with classical public-key cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC [12] , [13] . NTRU is also considered to be the most viable post-quantum public-key cryptosystem [14] while classical public-key cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC are insecure in the emergence of quantum computing [15] . Several NTRU-based security schemes have been proposed to address security issues in the resource-constrained networks [16] - [19] .
An important aspect of research on NTRU is the development of variants of NTRU by use of other rings and their security analysis. Lots of variants of NTRU have been proposed [20] - [33] . Singh et al. [13] investigated the underlying algebraic structure of NTRU and its variants. NTRU and most of its variants work in the set Z n , which is endowed with the structure of a ring under the ordinary addition + and a specified multiplication * . The encryption of these cryptosystems involves the operation: m + h * r, where m, r, h ∈ Z n . Since the multiplication of the NTRU ring (the cyclic convolution product) corresponds to the vector-matrix product, Pan and Deng [21] proposed a general NTRU-like framework which works in the ordinary additive group Z n (row vector). The encryption of this general NTRU-like framework involves the operation: m + rH, where m, r ∈ Z n and H ∈ Z n×n .
It is well-known that an endomorphism h of Z n corresponds to an n × n matrix H over Z, and the vector-matrix product rH of vector r and matrix H is equal to the image h(r) of r under h. Based on this fact, we will extend NTRU to the general group. We will propose a group-based NTRU-like public-key cryptosystem, namely the GTRU(Group Theory Research Unit) public-key cryptosystem. Suppose G is group with group operation and E(G) is the endomorphism group of G. In GTRU constructed by G, the encryption involves the operation: m h(r), where m, r ∈ G, and h ∈ E(G). We will also construct high-performance GTRU for IoT by the use of the non-abelian poly-Z group Z n−3 × H, where H is the discrete Heisenberg group. Security analysis will show that our proposed GTRU for IoT is more secure than NTRU against lattice-based attacks. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. NTRU and the poly-Z group will be introduced in Section II. Section III will describe the general GTRU framework. Section IV will present the construction of our proposed GTRU for IoT. The security of our proposed scheme will be discussed in Section V. The conclusion of this paper will be stated in Section VI.
II. NTRU AND POLY-Z GROUP
In this section, we will introduce the original NTRU public-key cryptosystem and the poly-Z group.
We use Z to denote the set of all integers, then Z is the infinite cyclic group under the ordinary addition. For a positive integer n, we use Z n to denote the n-ary cartesian product of Z. As the n-ary direct product of Z, Z n is a group under the vector addition. For a positive integer m, denote Z m = Z/mZ. It is well-known that the operation mod m defines the natural homomorphism from Z n to Z n m . NTRU [11] has three integer parameters n, p, q, and four subseteqs L f , L g , L m , L r of Z n , where Z n is endowed with the structure of a ring under the addition operation (a 1 , . . . , a n ) + (b 1 , . . . , b n ) = (a 1 + b 1 , . . . , a n + b n ), (1) and the multiplication operation, i.e., the cyclic convolution product
where c k = i+j=k+1 mod n a i b j . The key generation, encryption and decryption operations of NTRU are as follows. Key Generation: We choose f ∈ L f , g ∈ L g such that there exists f p , f q satisfying f * f p = e 1 mod p, f * f q = e 1 mod q, and compute h = f q * pg mod q. The public-key is (n, p, q, h) and the private key is (f, f p ). Encryption: To encrypt m ∈ L m , we choose randomly an r ∈ L r and compute c = h * r + m mod q. Decryption: To decrypt c, we compute a = f * c mod q and recover m by computing f p * a mod p. It can be seen that the operations involved in encryption and decryption of NTRU include: the addition in (1), the multiplication in (2), the operations mod p and mod q of an n-ary integer vector, the operation of choosing the coefficients of an n-ary vector over Z q in the interval from −q/2 to q/2. NTRU can decrypt correctly because it used the simple fact that a mod m = b mod m and 0 ≤ a, b < m implies a = b for a, b, m ∈ Z.
We have known that the cyclic convolution product of two vectors h and r in Z n can be represented as the image H(r) of r under an endomorphism H of Z n , where H is determined by h. In addition, the result of the operation mod m of an vector in Z n can be represented as the image of this vector under the natural homomorphism. The following proposition shows that the result of choosing the coefficients of an n-ary vector over Z m in the interval from −m/2 to m/2 can be represented as the image of this n-ary vector over Z m under a function from Z n m to Z n , and generalizes of the simple fact used in NTRU. 
The following proposition is necessary to generalize NTRU.
Proposition 2: Let G be a group, N be a normal subgroup of G, E(G) be the endomorphism monoid of G, E(G/N
Proof: It is obvious that E(G) N is a submonoid of E(G). We first show thatf is an endomorphism of G/N for every f ∈ E(G) N .
On the one hand, if
On the other hand,f(
Next, we will introduce the poly-Z group. Let H and K be two groups with group operations · and * respectively, and φ : K → Aut(H ) be a group homomorphism. We can define the semi-direct product H φ K [34] of H and K with respect to φ. As a set, H φ K is equal to H × K , but the group operation of H φ K is:
A group G is called polycyclic if G has a subnormal series with cyclic quotients [35] , [36] . The Hirsch length of a polycyclic group G is the number of factors in the subnormal series of G. Specially, a polycyclic group G is called poly-Z if G has a subnormal series with infinite cyclic quotients. A poly-Z group can be created by successive infinite cyclic extensions [37] . Namely, up to isomorphism, a poly-Z group with group operation is equal to
As a set, Z {φ i :1≤i<n} is equal to Z n . In other words, any element in Z {φ i :1≤i<n} can be written as an n-ary integer vector. Specially, the identity element of Z {φ i :1≤i<n} is 0 = (0, . . . , 0). We use e i to denote the element in Z {φ i :1≤i<n} with a 1 in the i-th entry and 0's elsewhere for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For a ∈ Z {φ i :1≤i<n} , let a −1 denote the inverse of a. For k ∈ Z and a ∈ Z {φ i :1≤i<n} , the k-th power of a is given by
thus f is entirely determined by f(e i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In other words, f ∈ E(Z {φ i :1≤i<n} ) can be written as an n × n integer matrix.
Let n be a positive integer at least 3,
It is obvious that G n is a special poly-Z group. The group operation of G n is given by
and G n Z n−3 × H, where H is the discrete Heisenberg group [38] .
We have known that any element in E(G n ) can be written as an n × n integer matrix, but the reverse is not true.
Proposition 3: For f ∈ E(G n ) with f(e 1 ) = 0, we must have
In G n , we can verify that e j e i = e i e j for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, i = n − 1, e n e n−1 = e 1 e n−1 e n .
Since f ∈ E(G n ) will have to uphold the relations in Equation (4), we must have that
By f(e 1 ) = 0, we have
Proposition 3 shows that the endomorphism f of G n with f(e 1 ) = 0 can be written as the matrix with the form in Equation (5), as shown at the bottom of the next page.
Denote E 1 (G n ) = {f ∈ G n : f(e 1 ) = 0}. We give the image of an element in G n under an element in E 1 (G n ) and the composition of two elements in E 1 (G n ) in the following.
For x ∈ G n and f ∈ E(G n ) with f(e 1 ) = 0, if y = f(x), then
where δ i = 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n and
where δ ij = 0 for i = n − 1, n, j = 1 and
, g is the inverse of f, we have Equation (8) , as shown at the bottom of this page, and g 11 = f −1
11 and
We have known that the operation mod m of an n-ary integer vector defines the natural homomorphism from Z n to Z n m . The following proposition shows that it also defines a group homomorphism from G n to Z n m . Proposition 4: Let the function π m from the poly-Z group G n to the set Z n m is defined by π m ((x 1 , . . . , x n )) → (x 1 mod m, . . . , x n mod m) (9) then π m is a group homomorphism. 
Proof: If m is odd, then
is divided by m for r ∈ Z, thus f(x) ∈ ker π m for f ∈ E 1 (G n ) and x ∈ ker π m by Equation (6).
III. GTRU
In this section, we will generalize the original NTRU to the general group and describe the general GTRU framework.
Given a group G, a normal subgroup N of G, and a transversal T N to N in G, let π N , ρ T N andπ N be as depicted in Propositions 1 and 2, i.e.,
The parameters of GTRU include: a group G with group operation , two normal subgroups P and Q of G, a transversal
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, and two subseteqs L m and L r of G. The key generation, encryption and decryption operations of GTRU are as follows.
and compute h =π Q (f Q • g). The public-key is h and the private key is (f, g). Encryption: To encrypt m ∈ L m , we randomly choose an r ∈ L r and compute
Decryption: To decrypt c ∈ G/Q, we compute
The following proposition gives the conditions for GTRU to decrypt correctly.
Proposition 6: GTRU can decrypt correctly if the parameters of GTRU, i.e., G, P, Q, T P and T P satisfy the following conditions
Proof: In order to show that GTRU can decrypt correctly, we need to verify Equation (13) .
For every
, r ∈ L r , by the conditions C1 and C3, we have g(r) ∈ P, then
by Proposition 1 and the conditions C2 and C4, we have ρ T P • π P (m) = m and
by Proposition 2 and Equation (10), we havē
by Proposition 2 and Equation (11), we haveπ Q (f) • π Q = π Q • f and
byπ Q (f) and π Q are group homomorphisms, we have
Then, this proposition hold.
IV. GTRU FOR IoT
GTRU is an abstract framework. The security and the performance of GTRU depend on the choice of G, P, Q,
Not all groups can be used to construct GTRU. For example, in order to meet the condition C1 in Proposition 6, the group G used to construct GTRU must possess two normal subgroups P and Q such that E(G) P 
By the key generation, encryption and decryption operations of GTRU, the group G used to construct high-performance GTRU should meet the following conditions:
-the elements in G and E(G) can be expressed in a simple way; -the functions π N , ρ T N ,π N can be easily implemented for the normal subgroup N of G; -the group operation of G can be easily implemented, i.e., x y can be calculated in a simple way for every x, y ∈ G. -there exists a subseteq E 1 of E(G) such that f(x) can be calculated in a simple way for every x ∈ G and f ∈ E 1 . Z n can be used to construct high-performance GTRU. In fact, GTRU constructed by Z n is actually the general NTRU-like framework in [21] . In other words, NTRU is a special case of GTRU constructed by Z n . Next, we will construct high-performance GTRU for IoT by the use of the non-abelian poly-Z group G n = Z n−3 × H, where H is the discrete Heisenberg group.
As mentioned in Section II, any element in G n can be written as an n-ary integer vector and any element in E(G n ) can be written as an n × n integer matrix. In other words, the elements in G n and E(G n ) can be expressed in a simple way.
Given a positive m, by Proposition 4 and the first isomorphism theorem, ker π m is a normal subgroup of G n and the quotient group G n / ker π m is isomorphic to Im π m = Z n m . It is obvious that
and
is a transversal to ker π m in G n . Up to isomorphism, the quotient group G n / ker π m is equal to the group Im π m , then π m is the natural homomorphism from G n to G n / ker π m . We can define the function ρ T m as in Proposition 1 and the monoid homomorphismπ m as in Proposition 2. In fact,
• computing the image of an element in G n under π m corresponds to the operation mod m of an n-ary integer vector;
• computing the image of an element in G n / ker π m under ρ T m corresponds to the operation of choosing the coefficients of an n-ary vector over Z m in the interval from −m/2 to m/2; • computing the image of an element in E(G n ) underπ m corresponds to the operation mod m of an n×n integer matrix. In other words, the functions π m , ρ T m ,π m can be easily implemented.
Equation (6) shows that the group operation of G n can be easily implemented, and Equation (7) shows that f(x) can be calculated in a simple way for every x ∈ G n and f ∈ E 1 (G n ).
The above discussion shows that G n can be used to construct high-performance GTRU for IoT. Let n be a positive integer at least 3, p and q are odd. We choose G n , ker
as the parameters of GTRU.
For correct decryption, the conditions C1-C4 in Proposition 6 must be satisfied. By Proposition 5, the condition C1 is satisfied. By Equation (14) , the condition C2 is satisfied. By Equation (15) , the condition C3 is satisfied. In order to meet the condition C4, we must have Table 1 gives some basic information about GTRU constructed by G n . It can be seen that the complexity of the encryption and decryption of GTRU constructed by G n is same as NTRU. The key size of GTRU constructed by G n is much larger than the key size of NTRU if L f and L g are as described above. We can choose some special matrices as L f and L g to reduce the key size. For example, the public key size is (n + 3) log q bits and the private key 2(n + 3) log p bits if we choose matrices with the following form as L f and L g , as shown at the bottom of this page, where a 1 , . . . , a n−2 , b 1 , . . . , b 6 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
Next, we use an example to illustrate the key generation, encryption and decryption operations of high-performance GTRU constructed by G n . We choose n = 5, p = 3 and q = 41. 
Key Generation:
By using Equation (7), we obtain Equation (17) as shown at the bottom of the previous page. Encryption: Suppose m = (0, −1, 1, 1, 1) ∈ L m and r = (3, 3, −3, −3, 3) ∈ L r . By using Equation (6) and Equation (3), we compute
4 mod q, 10 mod q).
Decryption: By using Equation (7) and Equation (6), we obtain Equation (18) as shown at the bottom of the previous page,
4 mod q, −6 mod q),
. Finally, we gives a comprehensive comparison of RSA and GTRU for IoT. To meet the same security level for comparison [39] , we select 1024-bits as the public modulus size of RSA, and 251, 3, 2521 as the integer parameters in GTRU for IoT. As shown in Figures 1 and 2 , GTRU for IoT is far more efficient than RSA in the performance of encryption and decryption.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will discuss the security of highperformance GTRU for IoT.
As NTRU, the key security of GTRU is determined by min{|L f |, |L g |}, and the message security of GTRU is determined by |L r |.
Lattice reduction algorithms, in particular the LLL (Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovász) algorithm [40] and its variants, are the dominant avenue of attacking the NTRU cryptosystem [12] . In order to discuss the security of GTRU constructed by the poly-Z group against lattice-based attacks, we generalize the shortest vector problem on NTRU lattices.
where {b 1 , . . . , b n } is a basis for R n . The shortest vector problem [12] refers the question: given a basis {b 1 , . . . , b n } of R n and a norm N , one must find a non-zero vector v in the
Given a basis {b 1 , . . . , b n } of R n , where b i ∈ Z n , let the endomorphism f of the ordinary additive group Z n be defined by f(e i ) = b i , then f is a one-to-one endomorphism and
Thus a lattice L in the ordinary additive group Z n generated by f has the form L = {f(x) : x ∈ Z n }, where f is a one-to-one endomorphism of Z n . The shortest vector problem in the ordinary additive group Z n can be stated as: given a one-to-one endomorphism f of Z n and a norm N , one must find a non-zero vector v in the lattice L = {f(x) :
As mentioned in Section II, any element in the poly-Z group G with Hirsch length n can be written as an n-ary vector over Z and any element in E(G) can be written as an n × n matrix over Z. We extend the shortest vector problem to the poly-Z group.
We say that the set L = {f(x) : x ∈ G} is a lattice in the poly-Z group G generated by the n×n matrix f over Z, where f corresponds to a one-to-one endomorphism of G.
It can be seen that the lattice in the ordinary additive group Z n is actually the original lattice. It is important to note that the lattice in the poly-Z group G generated by the n × n matrix f over Z depends on the structure of G. For example, if
, thus the lattice in the ordinary additive group Z 3 generated by f is not equal to the lattice in the Heisenberg group H generated by f.
The shortest vector problem in the poly-Z group G refers the question: given an n × n matrix f over Z and a norm N , where f corresponds to a one-to-one endomorphism of G, one must find a non-zero vector v in the lattice L = {f(x) :
It can be seen that the shortest vector problem in the ordinary additive group Z n is actually the original shortest vector problem. The shortest vector problem in the poly-Z group, as the generalization of the original shortest vector problem, is at least as difficult as the original shortest vector problem. The best-known algorithm for the original shortest vector problem is the LLL algorithm and its variants. So far, there is no relevant research on the shortest vector problem in the non-abelian poly-Z group. Because of the non-commutative property of the non-abelian poly-Z group, the LLL algorithm and its variants cannot be used for the shortest vector problem in the non-abelian poly-Z group. We have reason to believe that the shortest vector problem in the non-abelian poly-Z group is more difficult than the original shortest vector problem.
Let G n be a poly-Z group with Hirsch length n. As NTRU, the direct attack against GTRU constructed by G n is to recover the private keys f and g from the public-key h. Suppose the public-key h = (h ij mod q) n×n , where h ij ∈ T q and y) ) : x, y ∈ G n } be the lattice in G 2 n generated by h . The private keys f and g satisfy the relation
For a suitable choice of u i , (f(e i ), g(e i )) = h ((f(e i ), u i ) ) is in the lattice L, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since f(e i ) and g(e i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n are ''small'' vector, we can recover f and g by finding n ''small'' vectors in the lattice L. In other words, the security of GTRU constructed by G n is related to the hardness of the shortest vector problem in G 2 n . The ordinary additive group Z n is a special poly-Z group with Hirsch length n, then the attacks of GTRU constructed by the poly-Z group with Hirsch length n can be applied to NTRU on the ordinary additive group Z n . The group operation of the ordinary additive group Z n is commutative and the group operation of the non-abelian poly-Z group with Hirsch length n is non-commutative, then the LLL algorithm and its variants cannot be used for the shortest vector problem in the non-abelian poly-Z group with Hirsch length n. Thus GTRU constructed by the non-abelian poly-Z group with Hirsch length n is more secure than NTRU on the ordinary additive group Z n .
In Section IV, we have constructed high-performance GTRU for IoT by the use of Z n− 3 × H. Table 1 shows that the complexity of the encryption and decryption of GTRU constructed by Z n−3 × H is same as NTRU. Equations 1 and 3 show that the speed of the encryption and decryption of GTRU constructed by Z n−3 × H is a bit slower than NTRU. By the security analysis, GTRU constructed by Z n−3 × H is more secure than NTRU against lattice-based attacks because Z n−3 × H is an non-abelian poly-Z group while Z n is an abelian poly-Z group. Thus, our proposed GTRU for IoT is more secure than NTRU against lattice-based attacks although the speed of the encryption and decryption of GTRU for IoT is a bit slower than NTRU.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed GTRU based on the fact that the cyclic convolution product of two vectors h and r in Z n is equal to the image H(r) of r under an endomorphism H of the ordinary additive group Z n , where H is determined by h. Specially, NTRU is a special case of GTRU constructed by the abelian poly-Z group Z n . We also have constructed high-performance GTRU for IoT by the use of the non-abelian poly-Z group Z n−3 × H, where H is the discrete Heisenberg group. Security analysis shows that our proposed GTRU for IoT is more secure than NTRU against lattice-based attacks. Thus, the proposed GTRU for IoT is a safe and efficient public-key cryptosystem. Therefore, GTRU constructed by the non-abelian poly-Z group opened up new research directions of the post-quantum public-key cryptosystem. VOLUME 7, 2019 
